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Abstract 
As a result of the failure of formal top-down development, there has recently been 
increased interest in the possibilities of drawing upon the indigenous knowledges of 
those in the communities involved, in an attempt to produce more effective 
development strategies.  The concept of indigenous knowledge calls for the 
inclusion of local voices and priorities, and promises empowerment through 
ownership of the process.  However, there has been little critical examination of the 
ways in which indigenous knowledges have been included in the development 
process.  Drawing upon postcolonial theory, this article suggests that indigenous 
knowledges are often drawn into development by both theorists and development 
institutions in a very limited way, failing to engage with other ways of perceiving 
development, and thus missing the possibility of devising more challenging 
alternatives.   
 
Introduction 
The rhetoric of indigenous knowledges has been heralded as seemingly offering a 
way out of the development impasse.  In contrast to the past, when traditional 
knowledges were typically seen as obstacles to development, it is now claimed by 
some that these are pivotal to discussions on sustainable resource use and balanced 
development (Agrawal 1995).  Central to this rhetoric is the inclusion of the local 
knowledges of groups at whom development projects are aimed, rather than 
assuming and relying on the universal applicability and superiority of scientific 
knowledge and “developmentalism” (Escobar 1995).  Such approaches appear to 
offer a positive way forward in that they take greater account of the specificities of 
local conditions, draw on the knowledge of a population who have lived experience 
of the environments in question, and provide peoples with ownership of the 
development process.  While a consideration of the voices of marginalized people is 
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a relatively new departure for development research – and more especially its 
practical application – this is an issue more thoroughly dealt with in the literature of 
postcolonial theory.  Postcolonial theorists have critically examined the ways in 
which Western theory and knowledge have dealt with alternative voices and 
different ways of knowing.  These can offer important challenges to development 
theories, notwithstanding Goss’s (1996) concerns about the practical value of 
postcolonial theories to everyday development issues.  This paper therefore presents 
a postcolonial engagement with notions of indigenous knowledges used in 
development discourse to suggest a number of cautions about the nature of this 
inclusion. 
 
Indigenous knowledges 
By the close of the twentieth century, development had become a deeply 
problematic concept which had lost much of its initial promise.  Post- and anti- 
development theorists have argued that, rather than breaking away from the 
colonising attitudes of the past, there is greater evidence of continuity in the 
preservation of Western-centred attitudes, as well as an arrogant confidence in the 
almost unquestioned validity of science and Western knowledge (Escobar 1995; 
Pretty 1994; Nustad 2001).   Typically, “development experts” from the West are 
brought in to analyse a development problem and to offer a solution based on 
scientific method.  Just as in the colonial period, an assumption dominates that 
either Western science and rationality are more advanced or refined than other 
positions, or, more simply, that they are the norm – “knowledge” in the singular 
form – from which others deviate in their fallibility.  Voices that are local and 
indigenous to a particular area are deemed to face development needs as a result of 
their deviation from this norm (Escobar 1995).  Development can therefore only be 
achieved by bringing them into line with the universal knowledge of scientific 
truths, whether this referred to the management of soil or the management of 
people.  This certainty in the scientific path out of underdevelopment has been 
shaken, of course, by the witnessing of continuing high rates of poverty, and 
growing economic differences between countries.  The effects of development have 
not achieved their claim of drawing together all nations into the realm of 
development, but rather has witnessed ever increasing levels of poverty.1   
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 Faced with this failure of development, some development theorists and 
practitioners have critiqued modernisation approaches for being based on the 
uncritical transfer of science and technology from the North to the South (Peet and 
Watts 1993; Escobar 1995).  A number of writers have come to question scientific 
approaches as being the best, or the only, solution to development problems (see, 
for example, Ellen and Harris 2000; Kalland 2000; Leach and Mearns 1996; Sillitoe 
1998).  They argue that other knowledges – the indigenous knowledges of the 
people resident in particular places – can be of equal, or more, value.  Within this 
argument, Western (formal) science loses its universal position, and becomes one of 
a range of competing and contested knowledge systems (Homann and Rischkowsky 
2001; Mohan and Stokke 2000).   It too has to be regarded as a local or indigenous 
knowledge: one that is localised in the institutions of the West and has gained its 
apparent universality by being projected throughout the world through the 
formation of colonial and neocolonial power relations.  Thus, the domination of 
Western knowledge is explained not though a privileged proximity to the truth, but 
as a set of historico-geographical conditions tied up with the geopolitics of power 
(Escobar 1995). 
 
The recognition of indigenous knowledges presented the development community 
with alternative experiences with which to challenge conventional development 
praxis, and, indeed, as a way of potentially empowering hitherto neglected 
populations (see, for example, Leach and Mearns 1996; Holland and Blackburn 
1998).  Increasingly, development writing and, to a lesser extent, practice, is 
channelling efforts to draw in the voices and understandings of those who are to be 
involved.  In the 1980s, Chambers (1983) was already signalling that local people 
were rarely consulted about their needs, priorities or local environmental or 
technical knowledges, let alone allowed to set the agenda.  Hence, the results of 
such “development” were frequently inappropriate or even irrelevant.  Although 
Richards (1985) took the debate about the utility of local knowledges significantly 
further forward, with his work clearly showing how West African farmers used 
local, indigenous knowledge systems as the basis for successful agricultural 
development, there remains a persistent reluctance among many in the development 
 3
community to embrace some of these ideas.  This may be due to the continuing 
dominance of a scientific worldview, as well as perhaps the authority and prestige 
of the label “expert” which science provides.  However, the proliferation of 
academic study in the field of indigenous knowledge, highlighting the dangers of 
proceeding as if formal science alone could offer answers, makes it increasingly 
difficult for development practitioners to ignore this approach (see, for example, 
Bellon 1995; Briggs et al 1998; Lamers and Feil 1995; Maddox et al 1996; Tiffen et 
al 1994; Reij et al 1996; Sillitoe 1998).  Nevertheless, the extent to which various 
writers and practitioners have actually dealt with this issue is, as we shall see, 
variable.   
 
While the debate about the inclusion of other voices and knowledges into 
development studies is relatively new, it has been more fully debated in the 
literature on postcolonialism.  Analysis of the complicity between power and 
knowledge is central to postcolonial theory, an approach which seeks to examine 
how Western knowledge systems have become bound up with the construction of 
both colonial and postcolonial ways of knowing and acting in the West, but more 
significantly, also around the world (Said 1978).  Various postcolonial theorists 
have therefore examined the effects of Western domination of knowledge and 
attempted to formulate theoretical and practical strategies of resistance to this 
dominance.  Despite the apparently vital connections between development studies 
and postcolonial theory, however, there has been very little in the way of cross-
referencing between the two.  This reflects differences in political attitude, wariness 
over motives and divergence in specialised languages used to articulate relevant 
issues.  Many postcolonial theorists consider development studies still to be mired 
in modernist, or even colonialist, mindsets; to many involved with development 
work, postcolonialism is seen to offer overly complex theories ignorant of the real 
problems characterising everyday life in the majority world.  The two approaches 
apparently have little in common.  Sylvester (1999: 703) notes: “development 
studies does not tend to listen to subalterns and postcolonial studies does not tend to 
concern itself with whether the subaltern is eating”, a lament for the lack of 
communication between development studies and postcolonialism.  However, 
precisely as a result of their divergent traditions, she suggests that a dialogue 
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between development studies and postcolonialism offers great potential for an 
alternative conceptualisation of development.  Certainly, there may well be 
elements of postcolonial critique which could be important to reconceptualisations 
of development around the notion of indigenous knowledge, just as much as there 
may be very practical concerns in development studies which provide an important 
grounding for the conceptual and theoretical concerns of postcolonial thinking. 
 
Listening to other voices 
Yet to receive much critical attention in development theory and practice is the 
nature of the inclusion of indigenous knowledges in development thinking.  A 
central tenet of postcolonial theory is its concern with the ontological and 
epistemological status of the voices of subaltern peoples in Western knowledge 
systems, and a postcolonial interrogation of the inclusion of indigenous knowledges 
in development suggests caution.  Indeed, Spivak (1988) has questioned whether 
“the subaltern” can ever speak; even when apparently expressing her own views, the 
subaltern is not able to express her true self.  Writing about attempts to recover the 
voices and experiences of the subaltern in South Asian historiography, Spivak has 
argued that the subaltern cannot speak, so imbued must she be with the words, 
phrases and cadences of Western thought in order for her to be heard.  In order to be 
taken seriously – to be seen as offering knowledge and not opinion or folklore – the 
lifeworld of the subaltern has to be translated into the language of science, 
development or philosophy, dominated by Western concepts and Western 
languages.  For Spivak (1988), the implications of this “epistemic violence” mean 
that the ways of knowing the world and knowing the self in non-Western culture are 
trivialised and invalidated by Western scientists and experts.  Hence, the subaltern 
must always be caught in translation, never truly expressing herself, but always 
already interpreted.   
 
Furthermore, postcolonial theorists (for example, Spivak 1988; hooks 1990; Goss 
1996) have questioned the degree to which academics and experts in the West really 
want to engage with people elsewhere, an engagement which requires a de-centring 
of themselves as experts.  Some postcolonial theorists have already bemoaned the 
lack of true engagement with the knowledges and voices of the West’s “others”, 
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and, despite claims to be interested in others, suggest that the West is only 
interested in hearing its own voice (hooks 1990; Spivak 1988; Mohanty 1988).  
Hooks’ (1990) autobiographical approach tells a similar tale to Spivak in her 
attempt to be heard from the margins.  For her, the margins are a site of “radical 
possibility” which reject the politics of inside and outside, because “to be on the 
margins is to be part of the whole but outside the main body” (hooks 1990:341).  It 
is a hybridised indigenous knowledge which she believes offers a unique and 
important perspective which is not distorted by the power and prejudices of the 
centre.  However, hooks has felt silenced by those who seek the experience, but not 
the wisdom, of the other.  She argues that “I was made ‘other’ there in that 
space…they did not meet me there in that space.  They met me at the center” (hooks 
1990:342).  The experiences of the marginalised are used in the West, but without 
opening up the process to their knowledges, theories and explanations.  When there 
is a meeting, it is at the metropolitan centre, in the (predominantly) Western 
institutions of power/knowledge (aid agencies, universities, the pages of journals) 
and in the languages of the west (science, philosophy, social science and so on, 
expressed in English, French, Spanish and so on).  So by approaching the 
institutions of knowledge, she has been forced to the centre, a location both 
metaphorical in its control of authority and geographical in its physical presence.  
For local knowledge and narratives to be heard at all, they have to move to this 
central terrain, where they may be “accepted” and subsequently appropriated.  She 
claims to have met a reluctance to abandon the mark of authority, experiencing 
instead only a desire for material from which explanations can be made.  Western 
researchers want to know about her experiences, but not her own explanations:  
No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you 
can speak about yourself.  No need to hear your voice.  Only tell me 
about your pain.  I want to know your story.  And then I will tell it 
back to you in a new way (hooks 1990: 343).   
By retelling her experience from a Western point of view, hooks’ voice is included, 
but only as an example, or as data which the Western “expert” alone can interpret.  
Moraga (1981, quoted in Weedon 2002, para 8; see also Escobar 1995: 46) explains 
the effects of this appropriation:  
the white writing about Native peoples or cultures displaces the 
Native writer and often appropriates the culture instead of 
proliferating information about it.  The difference between 
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appropriation and proliferation is that the first steals and harms; the 
second helps heal the breaches of knowledge. 
These arguments can be brought to the discussion of indigenous knowledges in 
development studies.   
 
The knowledge of indigenous knowledges 
Frequently, where there has indeed been some engagement with local knowledges 
by development practitioners, it has most often been at a technical or artefactual 
rather than fundamental or conceptual level (Briggs et al 1999).  Concern has 
typically been with technical issues related to cultivation, such as methods of 
indigenous soil management, water preservation and medicinal plant use.  There has 
been rather less engagement with those knowledges underlying such indigenous 
technical and environmental knowledges.  Indigenous knowledge is allowed to offer 
contained technical solutions that fit within the current scientific/development 
worldview, but not challenge the content, structure or value-system of this view.  
There continues to be a suspicion and wariness about the extent to which indigenous 
knowledges are capable of challenging currently accepted ideas of development by 
pushing formal science to the margins.  Formal science still represents a powerful 
body of knowledge, and it is still the language of authority and dominance in many 
development debates.  Indeed, Pretty (1994: 38) has observed that “the trouble with 
normal science is that it gives credibility to opinion only when it is defined in 
scientific language, which may be inadequate for describing the complex and 
changing experiences of farmers and other actors in rural development”.  As a 
result, knowledges, other than those derived from formal science, are still eyed 
suspiciously by many in the development community, except where perhaps 
relatively straightforward and uncontroversial indigenous technical solutions can be 
incorporated into development practice.  Just as in hooks’ example, the experts look 
for experiences to analyse, but not the voice of the indigenous peoples which might 
offer different – and challenging – interpretations. 
 
In part, this may be due to where Western academics look and listen for the voices 
of the other, and how.  As Escobar (1995: 219) has argued, everywhere there is the 
production of alternatives to developmentalism, resistant practices, however 
mundane.  Similarly, Scott (1985) has highlighted some of the “hidden transcripts” 
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of resistant action of the apparently powerless, what he calls the “weapons of the 
weak”.  The “voices” are there if the methods of the researchers are appropriately 
tuned in to them.  Moreover, the voices may actually be embodied performances, 
rather than the coherent articulations of speech or writing which the academic 
usually seeks.  Escobar (1995: 223) argues that the “subaltern do in fact speak, even 
if the audibility of their voices in circles where ‘the West’ is reflected upon and 
theorised is tenuous at best”.  Rather than always expecting debate to come to the 
West then, it is important that Western research is itself decentred.   
 
In this context, there has sometimes been a tendency to see indigenous knowledges 
as ideas that can be brought together with formal science in unproblematic ways 
(De Queiroz and Norton 1992; Haburema and Steiner 1997; Payton et al 2003).  
Rather than seeing localised knowledges as offering potential challenges to formal 
approaches, there is an expectation that there exists a simple process of addition of a 
variety of knowledges to produce a better way of knowing.  This may be a valuable 
end in itself, particularly when marginalized peoples can adopt and adapt those 
knowledges which fit their situation, but this approach can be naive of political 
power relations which ensure that never can all knowledges sit equally together.  
The exigencies of each situation mean that certain views and voices will be heard 
much more clearly.  Liberal desires for the inclusion of a range of voices in the 
development process is a case in point.  This offers an unproblematic call for the 
meeting of voices, ignoring the power-politics of how this might actually occur in 
practice.  Part of the liberal argument is that indigenous practices of, for instance, 
soil management, need to be understood to ensure that inappropriate development 
approaches are not introduced.  However, attempts to deal with issues beyond this 
material or technical level are often unclear.  How should there be a resolution of a 
conflict of interests, as in the examples Blaikie (1995) presents in his argument for a 
Third World ecology between Western conservationists who want to preserve large 
animals such as elephants, and local farmers who see them as a dangerous pest?  He 
insists that all voices need to be considered.  While this is all well and good, at no 
point does he indicate how this drawing together of voices should be managed.  
From whose perspective should competing views be judged?  Who should decide 
which point is most valid?  The examples he presents are resolved from the 
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perspective of Western science, a “good” version of this science which involves 
fieldwork, and attention to local detail, but a Western-centred understanding of 
environment and resources nevertheless (Blaikie 1995).  For Blaikie, problems only 
emerge with science once results and recommendations are passed on to politicians; 
this is where the distortions and misrepresentations emerge.  The problem with 
views on indigenous knowledge such as Blaikie’s is that in a liberal (as opposed to a 
more radical) embracing of different voices, there is an obfuscation of the process 
through which conflicts are resolved and decisions are made and, more often than 
not, this disguises the ongoing dominance of Western knowledge and Western 
power.  The common adoption of the abbreviation “IK” seems to emphasise the 
view of indigenous knowledge as a technicality, hiding deeper ways of knowing 
behind this neat sign. 
 
The recent adoption of the language of “IK” by development institutions such as the 
World Bank further emphasises this point.  The World Bank’s “Indigenous 
Knowledge for Development: a framework for action” (1998: i) appropriately 
argues that there is a need “not only to help bring global knowledge to the 
developing countries, but also to learn about indigenous knowledge (IK) from these 
countries, paying particular attention to the knowledge base of the poor”.  However, 
the framework continues by listing a range of mostly technical and discrete 
knowledges which can be identified (such as herbal medicine, p.1).  There is no 
sense of dealing with embedded knowledges which are part of the wider worldview 
of the people involved, such as understandings of social justice, gender relations, 
familial responsibility and so on.  The World Bank’s indigenous knowledge 
framework similarly reveals a displacement of the valuation process.  When noting 
that not all indigenous practices are beneficial to sustainable development (using the 
well-worn examples of slash and burn agriculture and female circumcision to make 
its point), it suggests that before adopting an indigenous knowledge, 
…practices need to be scrutinized for their appropriateness just as 
any other technology.  In addition to scientific proof, local evidence 
and the sociocultural background in which the practices are 
embedded also need consideration in the process of validation and 
evaluation. (World Bank 1998: 6). 
There is no indication of how this evaluation will take place.  It is clear later in the 
document that essentially indigenous knowledge should not offer too great a 
 9
challenge to the established order.  The report states that “IK should complement, 
rather than compete with global knowledge systems in the implementation of 
projects” (World Bank 1998: 8).  Thus, just as with Blaikie, it is still the scientific 
view, in all its wisdom, that can decide which indigenous knowledge is worthy of 
serious investigation and dissemination elsewhere.  Indigenous knowledge is not 
being allowed to offer a fundamental challenge to development, just the opportunity 
to offer a few technical solutions, place-specific tweakings and so on.  Elsewhere in 
the World Bank’s website,2 this unproblematic view is reiterated, in that the “IK 
Program promotes the integration of IK systems into World Bank-supported 
programs” (Gorjestani no date, accessed 2003: 4, emphasis added).  The illustration 
accompanying this article reinforces the idea of a seamless incorporation of ideas, 
with no sense of the conflict that alternative views of environment and development 
might produce (fig. 1). 
 
However, if indigenous knowledges are to be genuinely brought into conversation 
with Western notions of development, this does have to be a true exchange and 
cannot be a simple case of incorporation.  Western science as a knowledge must be 
open to change, however difficult this might be.  In discussing scientists’ fears that 
fully embracing the significance of indigenous knowledge might lead to the 
validation of approaches such as creationism and astrology, Nakashima and de 
Guchteneire (1999:40) suggest that: 
we might consider that the discomfort of these scientists gives 
expression to a more fundamental concern…about the relationship 
between science and these other systems of knowledge, other 
understandings of the world.  Of course, if indigenous knowledge is 
conceived as just another information set from which data can be 
extracted to plug into scientific frameworks of understanding, then we 
do not trouble the scientific worldview.  However, this practical 
approach – that of the pharmaceutical industry or of conservation 
ecologists who validate traditional information and use it to attain pre-
defined ends – may threaten the integrity of traditional knowledge 
systems.  On the other hand, if science is seen as one knowledge 
system among many, then scientists must reflect on the relativity of 
their knowledge and their interpretations of ‘reality’.  For the survival 
of traditional knowledge as a dynamic, living and culturally 
meaningful system, this debate cannot be avoided. 
This suggests a call for a much more significant reconceptualisation of development 
than the liberal views suggested by Blaikie (1995) and, even more so, by institutions 
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such as the World Bank.  Voices of others, Nakashima and de Guchteneire (1999) 
argue, must be allowed to critique dominant world views, challenge terms of debate 
and propose alternative agendas, rather than simply being added in to an existing 
way of doing things.  It is interesting that although there is much discussion of the 
possibilities of shifting indigenous knowledges between different geographical 
locations and the problems of place-specificity, there is no discussion on these terms 
about the movement of Western science and development between differing 
economic, socio-cultural and political places.  There is little recognition of the 
embeddedness of these knowledge systems and the changes to them that will be 
effected with geographical movement.  Nakashima and de Guchteneire (1999) 
suggest that this failure will either end up preserving indigenous knowledge as an 
unchanging artefact of a timeless culture, or will decontextualise it, distorting it out 
of all recognition to those who had depended upon it for daily life.  The following 
examples exemplify these concerns. 
 
Indigenous environmental knowledges 
Some approaches to indigenous knowledge can lead to a freezing of traditional 
cultures and ways of knowing.  Such treatment supports indigenous knowledge only 
if presented as an unchanging presence.  Silvern (1995) explains how this is played 
out in terms of native American use of natural resources.  He discusses European-
American protests of the Ojibwe tribe’s fishing practices in the lakes of northern 
Wisconsin.  The Ojibwe have traditional rights to fish in this area as a result of the 
Wisconsin Treaty Rights but their spearing of the fish, especially in the spawning 
season, is seen as “unsporting” by many other residents of the area.  For some, their 
hunting would be acceptable only if it were ceremonial, “and only if the tribes used 
spearing technology and methods that were available at the time of the signing of 
the treaties in the nineteenth century” (Silvern 1995: 281).  That the Ojibwe now 
use motorised boats, battery-powered lamps and metal harpoons, marks them, and 
their knowledges of environmental management, as non-traditional, and there have 
been calls for them to return to birch bark canoes, pitch torches and wooden spears.  
Although the knowledges of conservation (rather than sport or profit) that underlie 
these technological advances remain, they are seen as irrelevant.  For many, to 
recognise these claims to indigenous knowledge, Ojibwe practices would have to 
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remain unchanged from some point in the nineteenth century which was considered 
“traditional”. 
 
It is also important to consider carefully the effect of incorporating different 
knowledges into Western knowledge.  There may be unintended outcomes.  Kalland 
(2000: 327) provides the following example concerning the appropriation of Indian 
and Oriental philosophies into “a Western tradition of absolutism”: 
This has produced environmentalist and animal rights discourses 
which are quite alien to the donor cosmologies.  Not only has animal 
rights discourse – and to a lesser extent the environmentalist 
discourse – turned respect for game animals into ‘intrinsic value’, but 
also their missionary zeal stands in sharp contrast to the contextual 
approaches of many local peoples.  Ironically, then, the 
environmentalist and animal rights discourses at times pose a threat 
to the life-styles of local people who depend on the utilization of 
animal resources. 
Such mixing of notions of conservation can lead to quite ridiculous situations, 
leaving people’s belief systems captured within a Westernised structure.  An 
example can be found in Wadi Allaqi in the Eastern Desert in southern Egypt.  In 
1989, Wadi Allaqi was declared a Protected Area under Egyptian law, and 
subsequently as a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve in 1994.  As part of the process, 
those Bedouin communities resident within the area were consulted about the 
proposals.  Hence, liberal views of how indigenous knowledges might be 
incorporated were satisfied.  Significantly, though, the key decisions were taken 
within the context of a Western environmental discourse.  In particular, boundaries 
were drawn around different tracts of land, including core and buffer zones, as well 
as around the whole protected area.  Within these boundaries there are particular 
conservation practices that should be legally observed.  However, the idea of 
drawing a boundary around an area of land, the inside being resources to be 
preserved, the outside being an area where no conservation needs to be applied, is 
very different to Bedouin understanding and use of their local environment.  For 
them, resources are defined in a more fluid manner.  Conservation is practiced 
according to need regardless of location in or outside a particular area.  It also 
reflects differing drought pressures on different vegetation resources at particular 
times, both on annual and significantly longer time-scales.  It is a temporal practice 
for them, necessary at certain times of the year, or in particular seasons.  
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Conservation practices also differ in times of drought, where there is by necessity 
less dependence on seasonal or ephemeral grazing, and a greater dependence on 
conserved tree stock.  At other times, these resources may be fully exploited.  This 
cyclical, temporal knowledge of conservation and resources is rather different to a 
Western spatial definition which constrains or excludes certain practices in defined 
geographic locations.  It is this latter view, based firmly in Western conservation 
discourses, which dominates conservation practice in Wadi Allaqi. 
 
This has resulted in some frustrating consequences for Bedouin living in the area.  
One example is illustrated by conflicting understandings of conservation of acacia 
trees by Bedouin and Western conservationists.  Acacia trees, of which the two 
main varieties in the area are Acacia raddianna and Acacia ehrenbergiana, 
constitute an important economic resource for the Bedouin to be exploited in a 
sustainable way.  They provide a source of feed for livestock from naturally fallen 
leaves, shaken leaves and fruit.  They also provide an important source of wood for 
charcoal making; acacia is particularly valued for the quality of charcoal that can be 
made from it.  Access to the various economic elements of acacia tress and bushes 
can be complex.  From the same tree, one family may have claims to only naturally 
fallen leaves, whilst another may have access to those leaves which are dislodged 
when the plant is shaken, and a third to only the dead wood for charcoaling.  For 
another tree, one family may have rights to all its production.  The situation can be 
further complicated by the existence of some prohibitions against taking resources 
during some times in the year, whereas at other times resources can be removed 
without any such difficulty.  This system, therefore, provides for a system of 
conservation of scarce resources, even though it may not necessarily meet the 
requirements of formal Western-based conservation practice.  Bedouin 
conceptualisations of conservation are culturally and economically embedded, and 
managed in the interests of their community interests.   
 
The issue about taking only dead wood from acacia trees becomes crucial.  In 1998, 
the annual level of water in Lake Nasser rose to unprecedented levels.  As a result, 
about twelve mature Acacia raddianna trees, located relatively near to the lakeshore 
in Wadi Quleib, a side wadi of Wadi Allaqi, were inundated.  Whereas other 
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varieties of acacia (e.g. Acacia nilotica) can withstand occasional inundations, 
neither Acacia raddianna nor ehrenbergiana, being desert varieties of acacia, are 
able to do so.  Inevitably, the trees died.  In these circumstances, the trees would 
normally be used to make charcoal due to the fact that they would never again 
produce new wood.  However, as the trees had grown within the conservation area, 
there was a prohibition against their use by humans.  And so, in order to comply 
with the regulations imposed by the conservation area label, Bedouin were expected 
to ignore the dead trees.  Unsurprisingly, Bedouin saw little logic in the formal, 
Western position of conservation.  There was a clear cultural divide between the 
two rather different views of conservation. 
 
But it is also on a daily basis that these tensions arise.  The fauna, as well as the 
flora, of the Wadi Allaqi Protected Area are also subject to Egyptian conservation 
law.  Consequently, it is illegal to kill snakes and scorpions, but, for Bedouin, these 
represent the two most pervasive and dangerous pests in the area.  Children and 
older people are particularly at risk and there are regularly serious illnesses and 
even fatalities as a result of contact with snakes and scorpions.  In practice, there is 
no dilemma for Bedouin, even though they are theoretically contravening 
conservation law.  Yet again, there is a clear disjuncture between indigenous and 
Western conservation priorities and approaches. 
 
Locating indigenous knowledge 
Of course, fully embracing the potentials of indigenous knowledge is no easy task.  
Once the stable point of science or development has been challenged as a neutral 
position from which to judge the merits of different indigenous knowledge, the 
ground becomes difficult to stand upon with any certainty.  Fear of imposing 
inappropriate judgements on different voices has led some to suggest relativism, 
and it seems that the fear of appropriating the voice of others has led some 
researchers to question their abilities to say anything about communities of which 
they are not a member (see, for example, England 1994), creating a general anxiety 
around questions of representation.  However, Radcliffe (1994) argues that this is 
not a solution to problems of power and (mis)representation.  She argues that 
“disclaiming the right to speak about/with Third World women acts … to justify an 
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abdication of responsibility with regard to global relations of privilege and authority 
which are granted, whether we like it or not, to First World women (and men)” 
(Radcliffe 1994: 28).  In a world made up of complex interrelationships and 
dependencies, to talk of coherent communities, within which some are members 
(and therefore somehow able to represent their community) and others are outsiders 
(and therefore cannot), is simplistic and misleading (see Jones 2000).  Moreover, 
this view of discrete communities is not one that most postcolonial theorists would 
be willing to adopt when analysing the identities of groups other than academics 
and their research participants.   
 
There has been further concern over the danger of what might be considered an 
extreme localism or what has been called, in a slightly different context, 
“anthropological particularism” (O’Laughlin 1995: 69).  Work on indigenous 
knowledges can lead to an impression that every situation is unique, and that each 
development struggle is entirely localised and specific.  Spivak (1988:290) has 
voiced this concern in relation to postcolonial studies which focus on particular 
constructions of power/knowledge, wondering whether this is at the expense of a 
global vision.  Such a view insists that while the experiences of 
“underdevelopment” may well be unique to each place, there are nonetheless 
important structures which link them together.  In a similar vein, Harvey (1996) 
fears that recent concerns with an identity politics sensitive to each situation allows 
capitalism to operate at much larger scales, unexamined and unopposed.  The 
effects of embracing notions of development around indigenous knowledges should 
not be at the cost of no longer theorising about the processes and systems through 
which the countries of the Third World are systematically resigned to poverty.  
 
Such dilemmas are not confined to those who study global capitalism.  Those 
concerned with understanding the workings of patriarchal power also face 
challenges in coming to terms with indigenous knowledge.  Fear of being 
insensitive to locally constructed gender relations has led some feminists to question 
their attempts to theorise patriarchy.  This has meant that often the social relations 
of gender “are labelled as falling into the realm of culture and strong advocacy for a 
rethinking of gender relations would be seen as unwarranted ‘cultural interference’” 
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(Rathgeber 1995: 207), although social relations based around class and income, for 
instance, are seen as open for criticism (Chant and Gutmann 2000:20).  While this 
discussion of cultural imperialism is undoubtedly important, vital to ensuring that 
feminism does not go the way of other discourses of development in a colonising 
mentality, which suggests that the outside expert is always right, it should not 
silence critical engagement between women in different places: 
Women need to be free to act from their own analysis and priorities and 
not be manipulated by outsiders; yet the restrictions of internalised 
oppression, which limit women’s options, must be challenged (Rowlands 
1997: 134). 
Thus, without imposing outside views on a population of women, “a methodology 
should be adopted that will help women to perceive the limitations that they place 
on themselves” (Rowlands 1997: 134).  Only when the critique of current 
conditions comes from the women themselves can development processes 
effectively challenge the relations of patriarchal domination and achieve 
empowerment.  
 
Thus, it is important to embed understandings of local processes of knowledge 
production within a greater awareness of systematic processes.  Indeed, some 
authors have argued for the necessity of work in other places in order to ensure that 
Eurocentric biases are countered with other approaches (Duncan and Sharp 1993; 
Sidaway 1992).  Sparke (1994:119) has argued that it is only the “hard work of 
specific analyses” which ensures that academics (Western or otherwise) cannot 
resort to easy stereotypes and instead appreciate the complexity of each society.   
 
To find these other voices (if indeed they want to be found3), it is necessary for 
Western academics to de-centre themselves: geographically, linguistically and 
culturally.  Rather than abandon fieldwork, it is perhaps now needed more than ever 
to de-centralise Western centrism.  This does not mean a naïve return to the field 
(see Nast 1994).  A number of authors fear the dangers of “exoticising” the other, of 
choosing a difference to study, for its difference, rather than because of any 
particular commitment to the group in question.  For example, Katz (1994:68) uses 
a comparative approach, not only to foreground her relationship to those involved in 
the research, but also to allow the research to reflect upon larger-scale processes: 
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By displacing the field and addressing the issue in rural Sudan and 
East Harlem, New York – settings that on the surface appear to have 
little in common – I am able to tell a story not of marginalization 
alone where “those poor people” might be the key narrative theme, 
but of the systemic predations of global economic restructuring.   
Hence, Katz recognises her ambivalent position within the research process; she is 
neither part of the communities being researched, but nor is she entirely separate 
from them.  She explains that each of us is always already in the field.  There are 
further strategies that can be adopted to increase this sense of connection, more 
obviously perhaps the importance of collaborative work, or engaging with local 
researchers at each stage of the research process, from project inception through to 
publication.  This is one of the reasons why some have argued for the importance of 
authorship with Third World academics, or the inclusion of research subjects in the 
production of final reports and papers which will represent them and their 
communities (see McDowell 1992; Scheyyens and Leslie 2000).4   
 
Conclusions 
It is important not to see indigenous knowledge as an artefact, simply something to 
be preserved (perhaps akin to the collection of genetic diversity) as a record of what 
has been lost to the seemingly inevitable march of Western science.  This means a 
wariness of glib uses of concepts of indigenous knowledge in development 
discourse, and a wariness of what we are perhaps now seeing as an 
institutionalisation of indigenous knowledge in the World Bank, and elsewhere, as 
“IK”, an uncritical addition to development practice.  Although there seems to be an 
implicit assumption in much of the literature that capitalism and western science are 
inextricably bound to each other, it may well be that if alternative knowledge 
systems offer potentially higher returns on capital than western science, then 
capitalist interests will inevitably embrace such knowledges.  Hence, we have a 
possible explanation for the World Bank’s recent interest in indigenous knowledge.  
However, the local knowledges of people on the receiving end of development 
practice must be allowed a more thorough challenge to the agenda. 
 
Indigenous knowledges all over the world are malleable, changing in response to 
Western ideas and practices, but also to an ever-changing array of other ways of 
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knowing and doing.  This is due to economic and social change, especially as the 
result of modernisation.   Thus we must not underestimate the significance of 
material conditions which influence the need for different knowledges.  Indigenous 
knowledge cannot ever be understood in isolation of the critical analysis of 
economic, social, cultural and political conditions.  As Agrawal (1995) argues, 
indigenous knowledge is not simply about language and expression, but about these 
material conditions through which people must survive. 
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Figure 1.  Image from World Bank IK web site  
(http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ik/ikpaper_0102.pdf) 
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Endnotes 
1 This was underlined in the UN Human Development Report 2003 which showed 
that living standards had declined in 54 countries in the world between 1990 and 
2001, 21 of which are in Africa. 
 
2 A caveat appears at the end of this article which states that “The views expressed 
in this paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed in any 
manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations or to members of its Board 
of Executive Directors or the countries they represent”.  However, the prominence 
of this article on the World Bank’s website suggests a degree of convergence of 
viewpoints. 
 
3 This set of arguments does assume that the subaltern want to be heard.  However, 
there are suggestions that the identification of the “hidden transcripts” of resistance, 
makes them legible to the very people they seek to evade (Scott 1985).  
Alternatively, some may want to adopt silence as a strategy of resistance.  Katz does 
accept the possibility though that there are times when the most appropriate method 
might be one of silence, acknowledging that “ethnographic work can (inadvertently) 
expose sensitive practices of subaltern people to those who (might) use this 
knowledge to oppress them” (Katz 1994: 71; see also Stacey 1988).    
 
4 This, however, is an intention more often discussed than practiced (Parpart 1993: 
455).  
 
